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Abstract—Delivery service via ridesharing is a promising
service to share travel costs and improve vehicle occupancy.
Existing ridesharing systems require participating vehicles to
periodically report individual private information (e.g., identity
and location) to a central controller, which is a potential central
point of failure, resulting in possible data leakage or tampering in
case of controller break down or under attack. In this paper, we
propose a Blockchain secured ridesharing delivery system, where
the immutability and distributed architecture of the Blockchain
can effectively prevent data tampering. However, such tamper-
resistance property comes at the cost of a long confirmation
delay caused by the consensus process. A Hash-oriented Practical
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) based consensus algorithm is
proposed to improve the Blockchain efficiency and reduce the
transaction confirmation delay from 10 minutes to 15 seconds.
The Hash-oriented PBFT effectively avoids the double-spending
attack and Sybil attack. Security analysis and simulation results
demonstrate that the proposed Blockchain secured ridesharing
delivery system offers strong security guarantees and satisfies
the quality of delivery service in terms of confirmation delay
and transaction throughput.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ridesharing provides partner matching services for re-
questors (e.g., passengers or packages) and providers (e.g.,
drivers of private cars or taxis) with similar or overlapping
travel paths [1]. In ridesharing delivery, drivers offer peer-to-
peer ridesharing trips with assured quality of delivery service
for packages [2]. It is a cost-effective logistic channel, bring
cost savings to package delivery for customers, as well as extra
benefits for the participating drivers. Moreover, ridesharing
also benefits the society by reducing traffic congestion and
carbon emission [3].
Recently, ridesharing delivery service has attracted in-
creased attention. For example, Liu et al. provided a private-
car-assisted ridesharing delivery system with roadside delivery
boxes, where a centralized matching method is adopted to
improve the profits of drivers [4]. In addition to private cars,
Ma et al. noticed that taxis with low occupancy can also be
used for delivery [5]. Furthermore, Febbraro et al. designed a
central matching platform to achieve hybrid ridesharing [6] be-
tween both passengers and package deliverie. The upper bound
of delivery capacity is derived in [7] [8], which demonstrated
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the enormous potential of ridesharing delivery to improve
traffic efficiency.
Existing ridesharing delivery systems are mostly based
on centralized architectures, where the providers report their
real-time location periodically to a cental server. However,
such centralized architecture may bring about data leakage
to threaten individual privacy. Moreover, the inherent defect
of centralized ridesharing system, i.e., single-server storage
and control for high-valued transaction data, results in a
huge economic and credit damage once the data tampering
happens. In order to solve these challenges, a Blockchain
based ridesharing system has been proposed in this paper for
the first time.
Blockchain is an open, distributed ledger that records
transactions in a verifiable and permanent way, which is the
underlying fabric for Bitcoin. Due to its great potential on
security and trust, Blockchain technology has been applied in
many areas to improve data security and trust. For instance,
Liu et al. proposed a Blockchain-enabled data sharing scheme
in Internet of Things [9]. By combining with deep reinforce-
ment learning, the security and reliability of data sharing
can be guaranteed. In [10], a self-organized wireless access
network based on Blockchain was implemented, where the
mobile devices can complete the network switching without
the guidance from base stations. [11] achieved secure and self-
organized data sharing in Internet of Vehicles by introducing
smart contract technology. The authors of [12] expanded
Blockchain and smart contract into medical systems to build
a decentralized medical data sharing system.
Motivated by the above observations, we propose a
Blockchain secured ridesharing delivery system with guar-
anteed quality of delivery service. The proposed Blockchain
system has the advantages of a decentralized ridesharing
system while ensuring data security and privacy. However, the
long confirmation delay of public Blockchain is unbearable
for ridesharing processes, therefore the Blockchain consensus
algorithm needs to be improved. Moreover, security mecha-
nisms need to be designed to defend against double-spending
and Sybil attacks in the proposed Blockchain system. The
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We propose a Blockchain secured ridesharing delivery
system. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first dis-
tributed ridesharing system. By leveraging the Blockchain
immutable and distributed architecture, the data leakage
and data tampering threats of the ridesharing system are
effectively addressed.
• A Hash-oriented PBFT consensus algorithm is designed
to reduce the confirmation delay from 10 minutes to 15
seconds in the Blockchain-based system. Security anal-
ysis demonstrates that the proposed algorithm can pre-
vent the common Blockchain attacks, including double-
spending and Sybil attacks.
• Simulation results show that the proposed Blockchain
secured ridesharing system offers strong security guar-
antees and satisfies the quality of delivery in terms of
the transaction confirmation delay of 15s, and the system
throughput of 15 transactions per second.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system
model and two attack models are introduced in Section II.
Section III describes the overall flow of Blockchain secured
Ridesharing Delivery system. In Section IV, simulation results
illustrate the performance of the proposed system on delay
and transaction throughput. Finally, we draw the conclusion
in Section IV.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we propose a Blockchain secured Ridesharing
Delivery system as shown in Fig.1. This system involves
four components: requestors, providers, attackers, and mobile
edge computing (MEC) servers. The jth requestor and the
m provider is denoted by uj and vm for 1 ≤ j ≤ N and
1 ≤ j ≤ M , where N and M is the number of requestors
and providers in the system. Each requestor sends a logistics
request rid  (o, d, t) to nearby providers for package delivery
service, where id represents the identifier of a request, o
represents the origin of the packages delivery, d represents
the destination of the packages delivery, and t represents
the submission time of the request. Notably, identifier id
and the submission time tid are automatically generated by
the system. Each requestor has an asymmetric key pair and
certificate assigned by the key distribution center for signature
and identity authentication. All Blockchain-related operations
(e.g., proof of work (PoW), consensus, etc) are carried out in
MEC servers. Commonly, attackers are equipped with strong
computation capability, posing a serious threat to data privacy
and security. Two common attack models are described in the
following.
A. Double Spending Attack
Double spending attack, also referred as alternative history
attack in cryptocurrency, is a potential security loophole in
the most of distributed systems [10]. An attacker equipped
with powerful computing capability can prepare a Blockchain
fork. Even the transaction has been confirmed by the current
main chain, an attacker can still alter the transaction history
by releasing the fraudulent fork. In the package delivery
ridesharing system, the double spending attack may result in
huge economic damage to both providers and requestors.
Fig. 1. System model of package delivery ridesharing system.
B. Sybil Attack
In a peer-to-peer network, a single node can masquerade as
multiple nodes by acquiring multiple identities, therefore its
influence on the voting results can be improved. In Practical
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) based Blockchain system,
a new block can be successfully added to the main chain only
after more than two thirds of the node votes to confirm it [13].
Therefore, by implementing the Sybil attack, the attacker alters
the voting results by disguising themselves as multiple nodes
to paralyze the system.
III. BLOCKCHAIN SECURED RIDESHARING DELIVERY
SYSTEM
In this section, we provide a detailed description of the
Blockchain secured Ridesharing Delivery system. First, we
provide an overview of the transaction completion process.
Second, the self-construction process of smart contract is
presented. Third, we describe the new block generation to
show how the Blockchain works in the proposed ridesharing
system.
A. Overall Flow of Blockchain Based Ridesharing System
To clearly illustrate the overall process of the proposed
ridesharing system, we consider an easy understanding ex-
ample in the following, and the specific interaction steps
between requestor and provider have been shown in Fig.2. The
following steps are corresponding to the labels in the figure.
1) Request Broadcast: An requestor in the system gener-
ates a request involving the origin, the destination and the
submission time of the package delivery. Noticeably, the origin
and destination are the location of the mail box deposited
packages, which avoid revealing the location of the package
owner. Then, the request is broadcast to the nearby providers.
2) Smart Contract Confirmation: After receiving some
requests, the provider performs the distributed matching to
search a desirable package delivery request according to their
requirements. If the provider decides to deliver the package,
it creates a smart contract involving the description of the
package and the delivery information, and then attaches its
digital signature at the end.
3) Contract Broadcast: In the following, the smart contract
is sent to the requestor for authentication, after which the status
of the provider is locked and no other requests will be received.
In this way, the requestor potentially receives more than one
smart contract, but only one contract is permitted to create by
the requestor according to their customized criteria, such as
delivery time priority or cost priority. Finally, the requestor
attaches the digital signature to the selected smart contract
and broadcasts comfirmed contract to all MEC servers in the
system.
4) New Block Generation: After receiving the confirmed
smart contract, the MEC server checks the validity of the
signatures of provider and requestor. Then, MEC servers
aggregate all smart contact received in the previous period
to create a new block, denoted by newBlock.
5) Hash-oriented Leader Selection: In this stage, MEC
server generates a Merkle hash value based on its own
identifier together with newBlock. Subsequently, the MEC
server with the lowest hash value is selected as the leader.
6) Consensus over MEC servers: Once the leader has been
determined, every MEC server verifies the content of the
newBlock sent by the leader, and attaches its digital signature
at the end of the new block if the validity of newBlock is
confirmed. Then, replicas of the confirmed newBlock are
sent to other MEC servers. Meanwhile, every MEC server
receives replicas from others. Until the received number of
confirmed replicas exceeds two thirds of the total number of
MEC servers, a confirmation message will be to the leader.
7) Execution: When the confirmation messages received by
the leader exceeds two thirds of the total number of MEC
servers, it indicates that the newBlock has been successfully
added to the Blockchain. Finally, the leader returns an ac-
knowledgement message to both the requestor and provider,
after which the provider will start to deliver the package with
respect to the information in the smart contract.
Fig. 2. Overall flow of the ridesharing system.
B. Smart Contract for Ridesharing Transaction
Smart contract, a standardized digital certificate to enable
the transaction process to be self-organized, is utilized to
record the ridesharing transaction in our system (a rough
process is mentioned in Section III-A1 to A3). In this subsec-
tion, three steps for creating a smart contract for ridesharing
transaction are provided in detail.
1) Request Generation: We consider that a requestor uj











where Certuj is the certificate of uj , Siguj refers to digital
signature generated by SKuj (the secret key of uj)
Siguj = SignSKuj (rid) (2)
Considering the origin of the request rid and path planning
suggestion, the provider decides whether to accept the request.
2) Smart Contract Confirmation: If the provider decides to
deliver a packages, the provider will generate a smart contract
according to request rid. The format of the smart contract from
provider vm to requestor uj is as follows.
vm → uj : SC= (id ‖rid ‖did ‖Cid ‖Sigvm ) (3)
where did is the service capability (e.g., pre-evaluated delivery
time, cost, etc) offered by provider vm and Cid is the license
of the provider. After that, the provider vm stops receiving
package delivery request from requestors.
On the other side, it is possible that the requestor uj receives
a number of smart contracts, but only one contract is selected
in light of its own customized criteria (e.g. delivery time
priority, cost priority, etc).
3) Contract Broadcast: After the smart contract selection,
the requestor adds its signature to the selected smart contract,
which represents that the requestor and the provider have
completed the ridesharing matching. Then, the contract is
broadcast to all MEC severs in the system, as is shown in
(4).
uj → MEC : SC=
(





Then, every MEC server verifies the validity of the signature
in the smart contract.
C. PBFT based Consensus Algorithm
A consensus algorithm in our system is a procedure through
which all the MEC servers of the Blockchain network reach a
common agreement about transactions in a newblock (a rough
process is mentioned in Section III-A5 to A6). In this subsec-
tion, a detailed description of Hash-oriented PBFT consensus
algorithm is given, and further we prove that this algorithm can
effectively promote the efficiency of the consensus algorithm.
1) Traditional Consensus Algorithm: First, we introduce
the basic idea of a traditional consensus mechanism, i.e., proof
of work (PoW). A PoW is a piece of data which is difficult
(costly, time-consuming) to produce but easy for others to
verify and which satisfies certain requirements. Producing a
PoW is a random process with low probability so that a lot
of trial and error is required on average before a valid PoW
is generated. The general form of workload proof is given by,
Hash (Prev Hash + newBlock + nonce) < Given value
(5)
where nonce represents a random parameter, newBlock is
the new generated block composed of smart contracts, and
Given value is a predefined value which can be used to adjust
the computation difficulty level of Blockchain. The structure




Based on the irreversibility of the hash function, the only
way to find a desirable nonce is to conduct a great amount of
attempts.
In the current public Blockchain, the computing time of
PoW is around 10 minutes [14]. Moreover, in order to avoid
the Blockchain fork, the final confirmation of a transaction
needs to wait until the transaction has been added to a block
and six blocks have been linked after it (about an hour) [14],
which is unbearable for both requestor and provider in package
delivery ridesharing. Meanwhile, PoW method poses a very
high demand on the computing capability, i.e., the miner
needs to continuously carry out the hash value calculation.
Considering that the Blockchain is deployed in MEC servers
in the proposed ridesharing system, it is unpalatable to occupy
large computational power of public servers only for carrying
out the mining activities of Blockchain.
2) Hash-oriented PBFT Consensus Algorithm: In order
to tackle the long confirmation delay and demand of high
computation capability mentioned above, we propose a Hash-
oriented PBFT consensus algorithm as is shown in Fig.3.
First, the requestor sends a signed smart contract to all
MEC servers during the broadcast period. After receiving the
contract, newblock is generated and proof of device(PoD) is
conducted to select a leader based on (6) [10].
Hash (Prev Hash + newBlock + ID) < Given value (6)
In the PoD-based mining, the hash value is produced in light
of the fixed ID value of the device, instead of a great deal of
tries in PoW. Thus, the number of hash calculation sharply
drops to one attempt, thereby reducing the computational
complexity. In addition, another merit of PoD is the lower
computation difficulty of (6) merely by increasing Given value,
thereby achieving lower confirmation delay. Among the hash
values satisfying the Given value, the server with the lowest
hash value is selected as the leader.
leader = {ID |min (Hash (Prev Hash + newBlock + ID))}
(7)
After the leader selection, all servers in the system verify
the validity of the transaction written in the leader’s newblock.
Once the validity has been confirmed, servers add their digital
signatures on the newBlock and send them to other MEC
servers in the system, as is shown in (8).
MECi → MECj :
messageMECi = (leader ‖newblock ‖SigMECi )
(8)
where MECi, MECj indicates the i
th, jth MEC server
respectively, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ K, i = j, K is the number of MEC
server in the system and
SigMECi = SignSKMECi (leader ‖newblock ) (9)
In the following, the system performs the confirmation
process in Fig.3 by exchanging message in (8) to verify
the signature. When the number of valid received messages
exceeds two thirds of the total number of servers, the server
MECj will add the newBlock to the end of the Blockchain
and return a confirmation message to the leader.





Finally, in the execution process of Fig.3, the leader returns
an acknowledgment to the requestor and the provider after
receiving the confirmation message sent by more than two
thirds servers, indicating that the transaction information has
been successfully added to the Blockchain.
Fig. 3. The consensus process of Hash-oriented PBFT.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the security evaluation of the proposed
Blockchain-based ridesharing system under the two classic
attack models provided in II, are analyzed.
A. Double Spending Attack
Double spending attack utilizes Blockchain fork to alter
the confirmed transaction records, resulting in huge economic
damage to both requestors and providers. In the proposed
package delivery ridesharing system, the Hash-oriented PBFT
consensus algorithm is adopted to eliminate the Blockchain
fork, the transaction needs to be verified by more than two
thirds servers of the system before being successfully added
to the Blockchain, thereby protecting the system from double
spending attack.
B. Sybil Attack
Attackers launch Sybil attack by acquiring multiple iden-
tities, thereby improving its influence on the voting results.
However, in the proposed ridesharing system, the identifier
and asymmetric key pair, are bounded to a specific MEC
server, which means it is impossible for a single server to
obtain multiple identities. Meanwhile, attackers may generate
fake asymmetric keys to masquerade as multiple servers.
However, the validity of the digital signature generated by the
asymmetric keys will be verified by all the MEC servers in
the system, thereby preventing the system from being cheated.
V. SIMULATION RESULT AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
ridesharing system in terms of the varying number of par-
ticipating MEC servers and block size. Moreover, the classic
Bitcoin and Ethereum system are considered as the benchmark
schemes.
A. Confirmation Delay
Confirmation delay is the time from the request initiation to
the request is confirmed by the Blockchain system, which is a
significant performance indicator for ridesharing transactions.
In this subsection, we evaluate the confirmation delay of the
ridesharing system in terms of the number of participating
MEC servers from 100 to 1600 with the block size from 40
transactions/block to 160 transactions/block.
As is shown in Fig.4, the confirmation delay of a new block
increases linearly with the growing number of MEC servers
and block size. This is because every server receives more
replicas as the number of MEC servers increases, thereby
results in longer time to check the validity of the replicas.
In addition, the larger block size brings about the longer
confirmation time due to more transactions to be verified.


























Fig. 4. Average confirmation delay with 0 to 1600 servers.
B. CDF of Confirmation Delay
In this subsection, we explore the cumulative probability
distribution (CDF) of confirmation delay, which represents the
completion probability under certain confirmation delay.
The curves in Fig.5 moves right along with the larger block
size and more MEC servers, because the growth results in
more transactions to be verified. Meanwhile, it is observed
that the proposed ridesharing system can complete the con-
firmation process in 15s with a probability approximately to
one hundred percent, under block size is 40 transactions/block
and the number of MEC servers reaches to 1500. The average
confirmation time of our proposed system is far less than that
of Bitcoin system which is around 10 minutes.





















Fig. 5. CDF of confirmation delay in different number of servers and block
size.
C. Transaction Throughput
Transaction throughput refers to the number of transactions
that can be processed per unit time in the proposed ridesharing
system. As shown in Fig.6, it is worth noting that the trans-
action throughput of the system grows to a stable value with
the ascending block size. The reason is that the time cost of
a single node is proportional to the block size, the expansion
of block size means longer time should be taken to verify the
transactions.
Fig.7 show the transaction throughput in terms of the the
number of MEC servers. It can be seen that the advantage
of the proposed system is obvious compared to Bitcoin and
Ethereum system, but the increasing number of MEC servers
brings about a sharp drop of transactions throughput. The
cross point tells us that the proposed system is promising
when the number of MEC server is less than 200. Considering
the practical situation that the number of MEC server with
a strong computation and storage capability to participate in
ridesharing in a city is less than 200, the proposed system
always performs best among the three systems and can satisfy
the requirement of the transaction throughput of a online
ridesharing application (At present, the transaction throughput
of Uber, Lyft, etc., is about 12 transactions/s). Thus, Fig.6
and Fig. 7 provide a suggestion for the proposed ridesharing
configuration.































Number of Nodes =  500
Number of Nodes =  1000
Number of Nodes =  1500
Number of Nodes =  2000
Fig. 6. Average transaction throughput with block size rise from 1 to 40
transactions.































Fig. 7. Transaction Throughput comparison with Bitcoin and Ethereum in
different number of servers.
VI. CONCLUSION
A Blockchain secured ridesharing delivery system is pro-
posed for the first time to tackle the data leakage and tam-
pering of the ridesharing system. Specifically, by leveraging
the immutability and distributed architecture of Blockchain
technology, we create smart contracts for ridesharing and
propose a Hash-oriented PBFT consensus algorithm. The
system is designed to reduce the confirmation delay and to
avoid double-spending and Sybil attacks. Security analysis and
simulation results demonstrate that the proposed package de-
livery ridesharing system offers strong security guarantees and
satisfies the quality of delivery service interms of confirmation
delay and transaction throughput.
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